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ABSTRACT | This article briefly appraises the state of the art in the history of emotions, looking to its theoretical and 
methodological underpinnings and some of the notable scholarship in the contemporary field. The predominant focus, 
however, lies on the future direction of the history of emotions, based on a convergence of the humanities and neuros-
ciences, and according to important observations about the biocultural status of human beings. While the article 
stops short of exhorting historians to become competent neuroscientists themselves, it does demand that historians 
of emotions take note of the implications of social neuroscientific research in particular, with a view to capturing the 
potential of the emotions to unlock the history of experience, and with a mind to unlocking the political importance 
of work in this area, namely, the shifting ground of what it means —how it feels— to be human.
K E Y WO R D S  | Author: history of emotions; neuroscience; neurohistory; bioculture; experience
Historia de las emociones: pasado, presente y futuro
RESUMEN | Este artículo evalúa el estado del arte en la historia de las emociones, considerando tanto sus funda-
mentos teóricos como metodológicos y algunos de los estudios contemporáneos más notables en este campo. Sin 
embargo, el enfoque predominante reside en la dirección que tomará la historia de las emociones en el futuro, 
con base en la convergencia de las humanidades y las neurociencias, y de acuerdo con importantes observaciones 
acerca del estatus biocultural de los seres humanos. Aunque este artículo no llega a exhortar a los historiadores 
a convertirse en neurocientíficos competentes, sí exige que los historiadores de la emociones tomen nota de las 
implicaciones de la investigación neurocientífica social en particular, con miras a captar el potencial de las emociones 
para decifrar la historia de la experiencia, y con el propósito de entender la importancia política del trabajo en esta 
área, a saber, el terreno cambiante de lo que significa —de lo que se siente— ser humano.
PALABRAS CLAVE | Thesaurus: experiencia. Autor: historia de las emociones; neurociencia; neurohistoria; biocultura
A história das emoções: passado, presente e futuro
RESUMO | Este artigo avalia o estado da arte na história das emoções considerando tanto seus fundamentos teóricos 
quanto metodológicos, e alguns dos estudos contemporâneos mais notáveis nesse campo. Entretanto, o enfoque 
predominante reside na direção que tomará a história das emoções no futuro, com base na convergência das 
humanidades e das neurociências, e de acordo com as observações sobre o estado biocultural dos seres humanos. 
Este artigo não pretende convencer os historiadores a converter-se em neurocientistas, mas pede que os historia-
dores das emoções atentem para as implicações da pesquisa neurocientífica, a social em especial, com o objetivo de 
captar o potencial das emoções para decifrar a história da experiência, e com o propósito de entender a importância 
política do trabalho nessa área, especialmente o terreno cambiante do que significa —do que se sente— ser humano.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE | Thesaurus: experiencia. Autor:  biocultura; história das emoções; neurociência; neuro-história
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Universal Temptation
At the heart of the history of emotions project is the 
claim that emotions have a history. They are not mere-
ly the irrational gloss on an otherwise long narrative 
of history unfolding according to rational thought and 
rational decision-making. Nor are emotions merely the 
effect of history; they also have a significant place, bun-
dled with reason and sensation, in the making of history. 
These two central claims require both a sophisticated 
understanding of what emotional experience is (or could 
be) and an openness to new understandings of historical 
causality and change. On the face of it, there is nothing 
particularly new about these claims. They were iter-
ated in more or less this form by Lucien Febvre ([1938] 
1992; 1941), who envisaged a history of emotions taking 
a central place in the Annales project. Others, less well 
known, came before Febvre (Bain 1859, 14-15, 28, 220-
221; 1894, 619-622; Lewes 1879, 153-154). Nothing much 
was made of these ideas until Peter and Carol Stearns 
took up the baton in the mid-1980s (Stearns and Stearns 
1985; 1986), but for more than a decade after that, few 
historians joined the throng. An uncomfortable debate 
lay at the centre of work on the emotions: essential-
ly, were emotions to be found in nature, or were they 
nurtured in culture? It was a debate that few historians 
felt comfortable about challenging. It has either domi-
nated interdisciplinary discussion about the emotions, 
or else it has lurked in the background, threatening to 
undermine anybody who went one way or another. But 
the debate has moved on for many; for some it has died. 
Historians now play a major role in emotions research, 
and some are reaching out to the emotion sciences in a 
convergent, sympathetic way. Essential to the success of 
this convergence is a resistance to the assumption that 
we already know what emotions are.
The temptation toward the universality of emotional 
phenomena is embedded in the sources with which we 
work. We are easily duped by continuities in language and 
by loose translations into thinking that love is love, fear 
is fear, anger is anger, and so on, and that we only need 
to take note of the changing contexts of expression with 
regard to these human biological universals. I am not the 
first to note that the archives are filled with hazardous 
materials! (Dixon 2012; Frevert et al. 2014; Wassmann 
2016; Wierzbicka 1999). Yet the broader semantic context 
of individual emotion words can be unfolded to reveal a 
degree of nuance and unfamiliarity, if only we set out to 
look for it. Moreover, the temptation to translate histor-
ical “emotion” terms, be they in Greek, Latin or any other 
language, either living or dead, is fraught with the danger 
of elision, anachronism and simplification. We should, as 
per the exhortation of Ute Frevert and C. Stephen Jaeger, 
entertain the notion that some emotions have been “lost.”1 
1 The coinage is Jaeger’s, but Frevert, who does not seem to 
have read him, has made the tag her own. See Frevert (2011); 
Jaeger (1999, 5).
Those who study emotions in the classical world are under 
no illusions that they are dealing not only with different 
“emotion” words, but with entirely different affective 
experiences. Hence any translation of cholos as “anger,” 
or of elpis as “hope,” or of eleos as “pity,” comes with a 
long digression on dissimilarity and serial warnings of the 
dangers of thinking that we know what we mean by these 
labels (Cairns 2016; Konstan 2001; 2006). Anthropologists 
have provided similar warnings for years (Plamper 2015, 
75-146; Reddy 1997). We should heed them.
Such caution has been integral to the best work in the 
history of emotions since the mid-1980s. That work has 
gathered significant pace since the turn of the century,2 
bringing us to the current abundance of new material. 
One of the distinguishing marks of much recent schol-
arship, however, is that it does not take sufficient notice 
of the important theoretical and methodological work 
that has come before it.3 Indeed, I fear that the history 
of emotions is being done precisely because it is the done 
thing, and this raises a red flag concerning the value of 
the tidal wave of spilt ink. There is a serious and import-
ant purpose to the history of emotions, but there is a risk 
that this gets lost in the pursuit of an intellectual fad. 
In this brief appraisal, I want to re-express what that 
serious and important purpose is, and to point out what 
the history of emotions is not. Central to this negative 
construction is my firm conviction that the history of 
emotions cannot simply be comprised of histories about 
emotions, while neglecting to historicise the object of 
their inquiry. The history of emotions must reject, in line 
with much of the latest research in the social neurosci-
ences, any semblance of psychologism that would essen-
tialize what emotions are. We cannot preconceive what 
emotions are and then simply write about them.
This in turn leads to a second cautionary note, concern-
ing the end of the history of emotions (in terms both 
of its telos and of its termination). History remains 
focused, fundamentally, on understanding the human 
past, of which the emotions have been an important 
diachronic component both at the individual and rela-
tional level. The aim of historians is not to understand 
emotions per se, however, but rather how they were 
experienced, what aroused them, in what form, and 
with what effects. Emotions are, therefore, an epi-
phenomenon of historical experience more generally, 
and it is to that broader project that the history of 
2 Reddy (2001) has been the catalyst for much of this work, 
combined with a renewed interest in Norbert Elias’s theory of 
emotional development over the longue durée and historians’ 
reactions against it. See Elias ([1939] 1994); Rosenwein (2002).
3 I resist naming names here. Suffice it to say that there is pres-
sure to produce a great number of works that stake a claim 
to topical relevance. Many recent works claim to be about 
emotions or a single emotion, but do not really ask what this 
means, or what assumptions are carried into the study.
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emotions ultimately contributes (Boddice forthcoming 
2018b; Moscoso 2012; Moscoso and Zaragoza 2014).
“Emotion”: A Slippery Category
Cautionary quotation marks appear around the word 
“emotion” itself as testament to the slipperiness of the 
object of our inquiries at a categorical level.4 The scien-
tification of “emotions,” as opposed to passions, senti-
ments, feelings, affections, and so on, in the nineteenth 
century, did something to emotions themselves (Dixon 
2006). The attempt to quantify, measure and materi-
alise emotions, in the viscera and in the mind, changed 
scientific understandings of what emotions were and 
how they worked, and in turn this re-wrote the cultural 
scripts for what constituted behaviour and communi-
cation recognised as “emotional” (Boddice 2016; Dror 
1999). One could demonstrate similar shifts along these 
lines with regard to other major changes in knowledge 
about the affective realm, from Aristotle to the Stoics, to 
Descartes, to Darwin.5 In short, “emotions” are practised 
according to a dynamic relationship within an episte-
mology of what emotions are, a delimited framework 
of available expressions (both verbal and gestural), the 
parameters of which are inherently political, and the bio-
logical materiality of the historical body.6 Emotions are 
part of the biocultural story of being human.
For the history of emotions to work, the nature node of 
the nature/culture dyad has to be smashed. To say that 
emotions change over time is incompatible with claims 
that there is something fundamentally transcendent or 
“basic” about (some) emotions. The history of emotions 
implicitly challenges basic-emotions models and the 
principal tenets of affect theory, and it is my contention 
that it should explicitly do so (Ekman and Friesen 1976; 
Tomkins and McCarter 1964). The risks of not doing 
4 I have been critical of a lack of theoretical sophistication 
among historians of emotion in this respect. Some histori-
ans of emotion have been casual about eliding the difference 
between passions, emotions, affects and so on, claiming that 
all such labels fall under the heading of what we mean when 
we think of emotional experience. I think this distorts the 
historical record on the one hand and flattens out contem-
porary semantics on the other. It also privileges a certain 
category of “we,” which presupposes that “our” under-
standing of emotional experience is the archetype to which 
to refer. See in particular Rosenwein (2016, 7-8, 17); Eustace 
(2008, 3, 76-77); Plamper (2015, 10-12, 38, 296, 299); Boddice 
(forthcoming 2018a).
5 For the experiential implications of emotional rhetoric, 
over the longue durée and against biologizing trends, see 
Gross (2006).
6 On emotions as a kind of practice, see Scheer (2012). On the 
political distribution, limitation and policing of emotions, 
see Gross (2006). For emotions and the history of the body, 
the best starting point is Smail (2008). The dynamic relation 
between feelings and codes of expression for feelings has 
been best explored by Reddy (1997).
this, it seems to me, are obvious. If we presuppose that 
we know what love is, or what fear is, according to a 
certain strain of transcendental psychologism or by 
reference to a particular brand of neurobiology, then 
we undermine our project with anachronism from the 
very beginning. The recent and profoundly important 
turn to the social among neuroscientists is empirically 
confirming, as historians have expected, that when the 
context of emotional expression changes, so too does 
the quality of the emotion itself. In turn, however, this 
brings about the downfall of the culture node of the 
nature/culture dyad as well because, for better or for 
worse, emotional experience is embodied in physical 
matter, thinking stuff, and visceral movement. We are 
left, happily, not with a binary model, but an integrated, 
biocultural whole.
Bioculture and the Neuro Turn
The biocultural turn conceptualises human culture, in all 
its infinite varieties and materialities, as part of the nat-
ural and exaptive evolution of the species in its environ-
ment. It has become meaningless to talk of affects that 
are, as it were, “natural,” and of “emotions” as phenom-
ena limited to that which is consciously self-managed. 
There is no reason to think that phenomena that appear 
“as if” automatic, to borrow Sara Ahmed’s formulation, 
take place outside of a cultural framework (Ahmed 2004, 
27). Even if it were possible to conceive of such automa-
ticity in the human body outside of a cultural context, 
it would be impossible to find such a human body. This 
observation throws open the scope of the history of 
emotions and points it in the direction of experience 
more broadly conceived. We cannot simply analyse con-
ventions of expression in historical context and avoid 
the conclusion that, in documenting the historicity of 
gesture and utterance, we are also historicizing the expe-
rience of gesturing and uttering. We cannot simply anal-
yse those emotional experiences —however dynamically 
they involve body and context— that we are conscious 
of, without also acknowledging that such emotive pro-
cesses are running in the background. Our bioculturality 
does not afford us a “natural” realm to which to refer 
automatic processes.
If, along with the history of the senses and the history 
of ideas, the history of emotions’ chief contribution lies 
in its capacity to reveal the historicity of human experi-
ence, then it must look, as it develops, to insights from 
the neurosciences and to significant crossovers with 
neuro-historical approaches to history (Bourke 2016, 126; 
Burman 2012; McGrath 2016; Smail 2008). This is where 
it can achieve real traction as an historical methodology. 
After all, the history of love, or of anger, or of jealousy, 
is, in the end, about what it felt like to be in love, to be 
angry, or to be jealous, at one point or another in time. 
If we can allow that “what it felt like” changes over time 
and place, then we have the key to understanding what 
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it means —how it feels— to be human is culturally and 
contextually contingent. And in this we find the political 
significance of our project. The social neurosciences are 
empirically demonstrating the mutability of experience 
and the contextual subjectivity of perceptions of reality. 
Even some of the most basic experiential phenomena, 
such as pain, have been shown to be at once both highly 
individuated and closely correlated with cultural pain 
scripts (Boddice 2017; MacDonald and Jensen-Campbell 
2011). With pain, as with other emotions, there is no 
simple neurological and functional relation among 
stimulus, bodily process, and experience.
This has been one of the major contributions of work in 
neurohistory in the last ten years, which has pointed to 
a world of psychotropic influences on the body-mind, 
many of which have their effect without any conscious 
consumption or direct human agency (Bourke 2016, 
126; Burman 2012; McGrath 2016; Smail 2008). While it 
is easy to point to the psychotropic effect of new drugs 
(caffeine, alcohol, opioids, etc.) when they are introduced 
into a society, as well as to the (literally) mind-altering 
effects of new technologies (print, TV, Internet, etc.), 
there is a whole ecology of chemical stimulants that is 
contextually specific and which forms the background 
to the range and quality of human affect. Whether it be 
specific atmospheric pollutants that have an effect on 
human behaviour (lead, for example), or the presence 
of other substances in specific technological process-
es (exposure to mercury in various industries, both 
past and present, for example, has clearly documented 
effects on the mental and physical disposition of the 
exposed), or the rise and spread of new diseases (syphi-
lis is a prime candidate here), humanity is always being 
exposed to stimuli that —to some degree— influence 
“automatic” affective processes in historically specific 
and concrete ways. Daniel Lord Smail has argued that, 
in its focus on conscious processes and outward signs, 
the history of emotions is experientially limited and 
selective in its use of the historical body as explanatory 
tool. While human exposure to lead at high levels in the 
post-war United States (his example) cannot be used 
to explain any specific instance of violent crime in a 
given context, he argues that the connection between 
lead contamination and uncontrolled anger is demon-
strable, and that such a stimulus has to be included as 
a probable contributory cause in what has otherwise 
been a socio-economic story of late twentieth-century 
American violence (personal correspondence with the 
author; Boddice and Smail forthcoming 2018). More-
over, and this is where historians of emotion must take 
note, it is a cause that historians of emotions would, 
until quite recently, have missed.
While some will resist a turn toward neuroscience in 
the discipline of history, it seems implausible for the 
history of emotions to avoid moving in this direction, 
if it is to claim any relevance or significance beyond 
the confines of its own practitioners. The pathfinding 
work of Lisa Feldman Barrett in particular has unpicked 
many of the prevailing psychologizing tendencies, 
pointing to the remarkable plasticity of the human 
brain and the worldedness of synaptic development, 
as well as to the activation of the whole brain in all 
emotional experiences (Feldman Barrett 2006a; 2006b; 
Gendron and Feldman Barrett 2009). The temptation to 
link certain emotional expressions to certain “built-in” 
affects has been shown to be misguided and misleading. 
Experience is not intrinsic to some kind of biological 
wiring, though of course embodiment places certain 
limits on what can be possible. Nevertheless, to an 
important degree synaptic development and changes in 
body chemistry take place in context. If we were to pre-
serve the old binary relation, we might say that culture 
writes to nature, but it makes much more sense simply 
to claim the human as dynamically biocultural.
Future Prospects
The implications are profound. Human experience is, to 
borrow a phrase from the pain specialist Ronald Melzack, 
an output of the brain (Melzack 2005). Humans are not 
mere sacks of DNA, passively encountering the world 
around them and experiencing what is objectively and 
materially out there. Everything we experience is filtered 
through context, custom, cultural scripts and taboos, 
before being checked against what we know from the 
past (in our own lives and through what we know about 
more distant pasts) and projected outwards from the 
brain, as if automatically, as our construction —our inter-
pretation— of what is happening and what that feels like. 
The entanglement of culture and biology shifts the regis-
ter of possibilities for the history of emotions because it 
forces us to look at what is non-conscious as well as what 
is conscious.7 It displaces the wistful social construction-
ism of old and grounds it in an empirically verifiable field 
of evolutionary biology. It gives us cause to explore the 
historicism of reality, not as a simple gloss on a biologi-
cally stable base, but as an authentically experienced and 
embodied diachronic process.
Some will object, no doubt, that we cannot subject past 
actors to neuroscientific analysis. My point of conten-
tion is that we do not need to. The insights from the 
social neurosciences offer historians an opportunity 
that they are ideally suited to carry out.8 Knowledge 
of neuroplasticity, of the effect of culture on biological 
processes, and of the cultural framing of neurologi-
cal activity, suggest that we can look to reconstruct the 
conditions of historical experience, not to get at the past 
7 This limitation is an explicit formulation of William Reddy, 
but the theoretical work of Sara Ahmed, Daniel Lord Smail, 
Monique Scheer and others undermines it.
8 Reddy (2015) said as much, calling Feldman Barrett’s work in 
particular a “hunting license” for historians of emotion.
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functioning of the brain, but to get at the past feeling 
of historical actors. This lies partially in historians’ abil-
ity to piece together the cultural context of historical 
worlds, in their material, intellectual and social aspects, 
but it lies mainly in historians’ attention to the testimo-
ny of historical actors.
I have suggested elsewhere that the principal change 
afforded by the neuro turn is that we are able to 
approach archival material with an eye to the literal 
rather than the metaphorical (Boddice and Smail forth-
coming 2018). Since the cultural turn there has been an 
important shift towards taking the words of historical 
actors as meaningfully representative of the world in 
which they lived (Zemon Davis 1990), but underlying 
this there have been two opposed implications. Either the 
cultural construction of reality obliterates any reference 
to a reality beyond culture, or else the figural realism of 
historical actors is a simple gloss on an external real-
ity that can be investigated separately.9 The neurosci-
entific impetus allows us, instead, to take historical 
actors at their word, with their perception of reality 
and their experience of it being both an expression of 
their cultural context and a manifestation of the way 
in which that context was embodied. To be able to 
take our sources at their word, that they loved, feared, 
angered, hoped, despaired and suffered in this way, 
does not require any particular technological wizardry 
on the part of historians. It simply behooves us to find 
the parameters of those affective experiences in con-
text. This involves knowing the meaning and expres-
sion of historical “emotions” and emotion words, the 
social dynamics of their expression, and the causes and 
effects, including at the environmental level, of changes 
in these things.10 We do not come to know the historical 
brain, on a neurological basis, but we can come to know 
the history of experience.
In broad terms, these are the core arguments of my 
book, The History of Emotions, which is in press as I 
write this. As I was finishing my attempt to present the 
diverse range of approaches and the vast scale of peri-
odical coverage of scholarship in the history of emo-
tions to students and scholars, I realised that, publishing 
being what it is, my book would be bibliographically 
9 This was the defining theme of the post-modern turn. The 
phrase “figural realism,” of course, belongs to Hayden 
White (1999).
10 There are some fantastic examples of this kind of work. 
Nicole Eustace, in particular, has carefully explored both 
the social dynamics of love and of anger in her wide-rang-
ing work on pre-revolutionary America, Passion is the Gale 
(2008). Key to this is a sensitivity to the relation of social 
convention in private correspondence about, say, love, 
which at the same time informs the experience of love. She 
is equally alive to the shifting possibilities of public anger 
and the social dynamics that circumscribe both the experi-
ence and the expression of that emotion.
behind the curve by the time it appeared. The history 
of emotions, as a field, has reached a size that makes 
appraising it as a whole daunting, if it is even possible. 
New scholarship is appearing at a rate that makes even 
just keeping up with the reading a difficult task. It is a 
sign of the rude health of the field, but it comes with 
some caveats, which I have outlined in broad terms 
here. If the future of the history of emotions is uncer-
tain, dependent for its rationale, if not its methodology, 
on the ongoing development of the social neuroscienc-
es, its future possibilities are nonetheless exciting for 
that very reason.
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